Fishing for an alternative

September 15, 2016

Why a fishing trip isn’t the best place to decide the future of the country.

An unexpected Putin-Medvedev fishing trip – by no means their first – has coincided with the launch of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s “Replacing Putin” project, designed to identify an alternative presidential candidate in time for the 2018 election. Even if Putin seeks a new term – an assumption both Russian and global elites are currently operating on – the problem of handing over the reins of power in Russia isn’t simply going to disappear; indeed, it is a problem that can only deepen with every year that the current status quo remains in place.

As Putin and Medvedev have already demonstrated to the political elite, their fishing trips tend to be far from innocuous – and at least one such outing has played a determining role in the fate of the country. On August 17, 2011, the duo, who were vacationing in the southwestern city of Astrakhan (and doing a spot of fishing on the Volga), decided that Medvedev wouldn’t seek a second term, but that Putin, for his part, would seek a third. Although the tandem’s latest jaunt would appear to be a PR stunt ahead of the Duma elections on September 18, it still provides ample food for thought – and not only with regard to the narrow context of the elections.

Medvedev remains closer to Putin than any other public politician

Namely, it demonstrates, or was at least intended to demonstrate, that Medvedev remains closer to Putin than any other public politician; that Medvedev is unlikely to be dismissed from government prior to the presidential elections (or, indeed, relegated to a role with a title like Special Ecology Representative); and that, in all likelihood, Medvedev can continue to be regarded as a potential successor to Putin if, for whatever reason, the latter decides not to stand for election in 2018, or to stand down midway through the six-year term.

Medvedev is a known quantity for Putin and the elites – not least because he has already served as president. And, during his time in the top office, he didn’t touch a hair on anyone’s head (well, apart from that of then Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov – a dismissal that had clearly been green-lighted by Putin), and took no action that would have somehow weakened the standing of Putin’s elite. Furthermore, in what was an unprecedented move in Russian political history, he meekly relinquished power to his predecessor; never before had anyone done anything remotely comparable. Generally speaking, Medvedev must be regarded as virtually the sole politician with a genuine shot at picking up the reins of power in Russia, a country still lacking any proper democratic mechanisms – political competition, transparent elections, real parties – for handing them over.

In the absence of these mechanisms, Khodorkovsky’s “Replacing Putin” project appears naïve and utopian

In the absence of these mechanisms, Khodorkovsky’s “Replacing Putin” project appears naïve and utopian; in purely human terms, however, it also represents a perfectly intelligible attempt to demonstrate, at least on the level of political gesture, that a non-Kremlin-endorsed presidential candidate (a candidate, no more!) is a possibility in Russia.

At the same time, it’s clear that Khodorkovsky will be able neither to run himself (the law forbids individuals with previous convictions from doing so), nor to bring a favoured candidate to power. Navalny, the most famous opposition leader in today’s Russia, cannot run for the same reasons as Khodorkovsky.

The list of alternative candidates has a peculiar, somewhat ridiculous air about it; on the other hand, though, no one expected Putin to become president of Russia in 1999.

“Khodorkovsky’s list” currently comprises fourteen individuals, but it will surely continue to expand

“Khodorkovsky’s list” currently comprises fourteen individuals, but it will surely continue to expand. According to Timur Valeyev, director of the Open Elections project, the opportunity to propose a candidate will eventually be open to everyone. Already-proposed candidates include Yekaterinburg Mayor Yevgeny Roizman; Yabloko founder Grigory Yavlinsky (who, exceptionally, has put on record his willingness to run for the presidency in 2018); PARNAS leader Mikhail Kasyanov; Boris Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Yumasheva; Transparency International vice-president Elena Panfilova; Yabloko political committee member Lev Schlossberg; former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin; and others.

The issue of Putin’s successor was raised by the president himself in a recent interview with Bloomberg. Putin admitted the possibility of a successor’s emergence, noting that whoever comes to replace him must be a “young yet mature individual.” Going by this logic – that of Putin and the Kremlin at large – Medvedev would appear to fit the bill nicely. But here’s an interesting question: what if the current prime minister came to feature on Khodorkovsky’s list? Would the Kremlin regard Medvedev as a potential successor even then? Or would this represent a “black spot” of sorts for him?

In any case, Khodorkovsky’s project has not gone unnoticed, with presidential press-secretary Dmitry Peskov commenting that such “projects are developed by people who are irrevocably cut off from Russia, from everything that’s going on here, from the Russian agenda.”

Speaking of the Russian agenda, one of the most pressing political issues facing our country today is that it’s not overly dissimilar from the post-Soviet Central Asian republics, what with their lifelong presidents and such. Take Uzbekistan, for example. Immediately following the death of Karimov, the constitution, which requires that the head of parliament be appointed interim president during transitional periods, was violated: the Uzbek parliament handed this role to incumbent Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who will subsequently go on to become head of state. In Russia, too, the authorities are still wont to resolve the “presidential question” prior to any elections, and in private (during a fishing jaunt, for example); the elections themselves serve merely to rubber-stamp a behind-the-scenes decision.

Given this context, Khodorkovsky’s project may prove not-so-naïve: it may simply become an attempt to instil into the public consciousness the logical idea that, sooner or later, the country will have a head of state other than Putin. That there may be more than one – and, indeed, more than two – candidates for the post of president. That these candidates need not have any links to the Kremlin. That a change of head of state, if the state is politically sustainable, never entails the automatic destruction of the country.

And, finally, that the future of a nuclear power with a population of some 145 million people need not be decided over the course of a high-profile fishing trip.

This article was first published in Gazeta.ru