By Mikhail Khodorkovsky

I’m a Russian dissident living in London. Putin knows the end is coming soon

We now know the key weakness — the Achilles’ heel — of the Putin regime

Vladimir Putin has one trait well known to Russians: he ruthlessly crushes political opponents, yet always invents “non-political” pretexts for doing so.

For rulers like him, academics Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman coined the term “spin dictators” — people who conceal the authoritarian and unlawful nature of their power.

I spent more than ten years in Putin’s prison for calling him and his inner circle thieves and corrupt officials to their faces. But my criminal case consisted of hastily fabricated economic charges.

Over the course of ten years, I was held in prisons located in some of the most remote parts of Russia — from a colony on the border with Mongolia to one on the border with Finland. I survived an attempt on my life when a cellmate stabbed me in the face. And four times, I put my life on the line myself when I went on a dry hunger strike, ready to die if my demands were not met.

All of Russia and the entire world clearly understood that this was the persecution of apolitical opponent. But throughout all ten years of my imprisonment, Putin stubbornly denied any political motivation behind my prosecution.

So imagine my surprise when, two weeks ago, I learned that the FSB had announced that I and 22 of my colleagues from the Russian Anti-War Committee, the opposition group I founded in 2022 with other prominent pro-democratic Russians, were supposedly planning to seize power in Russia.

Has the Russian secret political police really dropped its mask and officially filed a political accusation? It’s a remarkable and new kind of candour. The FSB now openly admits that there are Russians dissatisfied with those in power and that the desire for a change of government, something entirely normal in any democracy, is a crime in Putin’s Russia.

Their statement even cited the Anti-War Committee’s Berlin Declaration from 2023, where we called for the liquidation of the Putin regime.

Of course, the statement announcing our supposed plan for a coup also includes the usual portion of lies — about our alleged preparation for an armed overthrow of Putin,“ participation in a terrorist organisation”, and “financ[ing] Ukrainian paramilitary nationalist units”.

We are not engaged in any of this. But there is also a rather honest explanation contained within the FSB’s statement for why Putin has become so angry with us:

“In October 2025 … a so-called ‘Platform of Russian Democratic Forces’ was established within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [Pace]. Mr Khodorkovsky presented this platform to Western countries as a ‘constituent assembly of the transitional period’ and an alternative to the authorities of the Russian Federation.”

Here lies the real reason why the FSB assigned a large group of investigators to urgently prepare charges against 23 members of the Anti-War Committee. This is a major operation, and its scale and seriousness suggest that the decision was made at the presidential level.

What has provoked such a hysterical reaction from Putin and the Kremlin — and why?

Yes, something very important happened at the Assembly in Strasbourg. The Russian opposition has, for the first time, achieved a degree of consolidation sufficient to gain recognition there.

Pace voted to create a Russian Platform composed of anti-Putin opposition forces. Now, for the first time since March 2022, Russia will be represented at Pace. Except this time it won’t be Putin officials showing up, but representatives of the Russian democratic, anti-war opposition.

This is significant — albeit mainly in a symbolic sense. It is more a forum for discussion thana governing body.

So what frightened the Kremlin so much?

I have only one explanation. The international legitimacy of the Russian opposition could become a major factor in the event of a sudden change of power.

Imagine that Putin dies or becomes incapacitated — not the most far-fetched assumption about a 73-year-old dictator. How will the Putin elite preserve its power, its wealth, and its impunity for the crimes it has committed?

What will we have in Russia after Putin? A prime minister whom no one elected but who was appointed by Putin. Judges appointed by Putin. A parliament whose seats were filled through rigged elections and whose legitimacy no one believes in.

The Russian regime is entirely centred around Putin. After him, the Russian authorities will have zero legitimacy in the eyes of both their own citizens and the West.

In such a situation, a delegation of the Russian opposition recognised by Western democratic institutions (such as Pace) becomes the most legitimate force. It could play a decisive role during the transition period and in shaping Russia’s future, if the West follows through on these promising early signs of support.

This is what terrifies Putin and his entourage. This is what drives them to hurriedly bring the gravest charges in an effort to discredit and intimidate the Russian opposition that is gaining international recognition.

When will this transition of power occur, and why is the Kremlin so tense right now? I cannot say for certain. But their actions make one thing clear: the regime itself believes it may happen very soon.

We cannot predict the exact moment. But something else matters more: we now know the key weakness — the Achilles’ heel — of the Putin regime. It is the fear of the Russian democratic opposition gaining legitimacy. Putin fears this more than sanctions — and even more than Tomahawks.

Therefore, if the West truly wants to put pressure on Putin, to weaken his position, and to bring peace closer in Ukraine, the most effective path is to strengthen the international standing and legitimacy of the Russian opposition.

I therefore urge all democratic institutions the world over to follow Pace’s example and begin an institutionalised dialogue with the Russian anti-war democratic opposition.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky is the founder of the New Eurasian Strategies Centre (NEST Centre) and co-founder of the The Russian Anti-War Committee

The article was first published in The i Paper