Six-week time frame would let Russia boost its coffers and influence a split in western allies

by Mikhail Khodorkovsky

A common argument in the discussion about the US and Israeli military operation in the Middle East is that Vladimir Putin is the main economic beneficiary of this war. The logic is simple: he will be able to sell more oil at higher prices and direct the proceeds to the war against Ukraine.

There is a degree of truth in this argument. However, it greatly exaggerates the economic impact of the war while obscuring afar more important consequence of it — Putin’s return to global politics as a global player. This may prove more significant than any fluctuations in oil prices.

The economy is far more inert than newspaper headlines would suggest. Even serious events, such as a war in the Middle East, will not yield immediate economic benefits for Putin. An increase in oil prices will not affect the Kremlin’s revenues in March – the economic effect will only be felt in April. Even under the most optimistic scenarios for Putin, the additional revenue will be measured in billions of dollars. This is significant, but it will hardly transform the war effort in Ukraine and guarantee victory.

In Russia, it is assumed that the active phase of the conflict will last five to six weeks. This assumption is based on an understanding of Iran’s military capabilities and the US political calendar.

These estimates are reinforced both by Donald Trump’s declarations that the operation is almost finished and by the declining rate of Iranian military activity. And it is precisely such a time frame that would bring Russia more advantages than disadvantages.

Within five to six weeks, Russia would be able to sell a certain volume of oil at inflated prices and receive an unexpected financial profit. After the war, markets would stabilise, but an important political outcome would have been accomplished.

The war’s main benefit for Russia lies beyond a simple increase in oil prices. One of Putin’s main gains is the deepening of splits within and between Western countries. Rising oil and gas prices have pushed the United States to ease sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons. Not all of the USA’s European partners view this positively, just as they do not have a positive view of the current military operation in general. Leading European politicians and senior officials openly criticise Trump. And, naturally, the focus of attention is shifting away from Ukraine, making it possible for new restrictions on support for it.

With international attention diverted elsewhere, we can also see the Russia trying to make a return in fields of soft power. Russian and Belarusian athletes are currently competing under their own flags at the Paralympics in Italy. Meanwhile Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s daughter is curating the Russian pavilion at the Venice Biennale. These are the thin end of the wedge, but that they have passed with relatively little fuss will encourage the Kremlin.

The war in the Middle East has exposed one of the narrowest bottlenecks of the global economy. In light of this, the Kremlin expects China and Europe to reassess the importance of energy supplies from Russia. China’s interest in the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project may also increase. The (officially temporary) easing of sanctions announced this weekend may have been a product of American tactical shortsightedness, but it again validates, at least in the short-term, an international role for Russian fuel.

Paradoxically, Trump did for Putin what he couldn’t achieve by starting a war in Ukraine: he basically took his regime beyond the status of a regional power. His conversation with Putin on the situation in Iran allows the Kremlin to capitalise on Russia’s years of presence in Middle East politics. The status of ‘regional power’ that Russia gained during the Obama administration may be revised.

However, if the war in the Middle East drags on, it could not only neutralise Russia’s short-term economic gains but also undermine the geopolitical effect the Kremlin expects to derive from it.

The main factor that could prolong the conflict beyond 5–6 weeks is a transition to ground operations. Regular US ground forces are not deployed near the border, but the Pentagon is planning special forces raids on nuclear facilities.

Even a limited operation – seizing materials in Isfahan or getting control of the Kharg terminal – creates a fork in the road: success will provide grounds for bringing the war to an end sooner. At the same time, failure will turn a ‘short-term sortie’ into a protracted conflict that will nullify the Kremlin’s calculations.

A long and intensive conflict would change the situation. It would threaten a global recession and weaken Trump, on whom the Kremlin is currently betting heavily. The importance of Ukraine may also grow, as a country that, alongside Russia, not only produces the most effective drone weapons at sea and on land, but also has practical experience of their use.

A recession would not only damage Russia’s economy. It would also put infrastructure projects and, by extension, Putin’s broader geopolitical ambitions at risk. And a hypothetical democratisation of Iran could significantly alter the regional balance of power, reducing the Kremlin’s ability to influence Middle Eastern politics to a minimum.

Whether the Iranian regime will endure remains an open question. The same applies to the timeline for the end of the war’s active phase and where this will leave Putin.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky is founder of the New Eurasian Strategies Centre and co-founder of the Russian Antiwar Committee

The article was first published in The Times and The Sunday Times