Kadyrov’s Dog

Ramzan Kadyrov and his cultured circle of advisers, have once again shown us how the Chechen tail is now wagging the Russian dog.

Mr Kadyrov and his attack dog (aka his aide) Magomed Daudov have once again created a pretext for local socio-political turbulence, publicly equating the Russian opposition with “enemies of the people,” and threatening to set Kadyrov’s dog Tarzan on them.

The statement provoked angry rejoinders not only from the oppositionists themselves but also from Putin’s human rights ombudsman Ella Pamfilova, who declared it unacceptable for the head of a subject of the Russian Federation to be conducting himself in this manner. In response, Kadyrov’s close associate Shairat Savaliev, the State Duma Deputy for Chechnya, boorishly suggested that Ms. Pamfilova drink some valerian and apologise to the Chechen leader. The ombudsman rebuffed this suggestion with the utmost vigour, stating that she would defend the Russian Constitution and human rights from all those that would encroach upon it – even from the mighty Chechen leader.

Konstantin Senchenko

Last week’s scandal came to a head following the actions of the hitherto unknown (or at least little-known) deputy of the Krasnoyarsk City Council, a local businessman named Konstantin Senchenko. Senchenko posted on Facebook an extremely sharp rejoinder to Mr Kadyrov, addressing him with the informal “ty” (“you”) and calling him (among other things) a fake hero, a fake academician, and even the “shame of Russia.”

Russian progressives immediately glorified Mr Senchenko as the newest hero of the resistance, without twigging that something wasn’t quite right in this story. That “something” was discovered literally on the following day. Senchenko recorded an apology to Kadyrov in which he expressed his bitter regret over the incident. He admitted that he’d lost his temper and underestimated the authority of the Chechen leader.

The hapless Senchenko even managed to fall prey to pranksters Lexus and Vovan

Furthermore, the hapless Senchenko even managed to fall prey to the notorious pranksters Lexus and Vovan, who called him up in the guise of opposition politician and Parnas deputy chairman Ilya Yashin, and fed him some story concerning a potential joint trip to Chechnya to assess the situation in the field. “Yashin” lucidly explained to Senchenko that his own public battle against Kadyrov would be impossible without some sort of diplomatic agreement with the latter and his circle. Taking this bait, Senchenko promptly voiced the formulations imposed on him by the pranksters.

The First Lesson

The first thing to be said here is “never rush to express your admiration for precocious characters that suddenly materialise on the political stage, let alone actually support them. Any politician that emerges in such a fashion must first be scrutinised for a minimum of six months.”

However, the progressive community, having over-hastily endorsed Mr Senchenko, could not backpedal fully; this would, of course, be tantamount to an admission of error, and, much like Vladimir Putin himself, this isn’t something Russian oppositionists are prepared to do. And a micro-mythology effectively justifying the actions of the Krasnoyarsk native was speedily constructed: Mr Senchenko was allegedly threatened with every possible reprisal, he was literally risking the lives of his children, and therefore everything he did was forgivable.

What’s important here is not, of course, the fate of Senchenko, but the reaction of a large swathe of society to Kadyrov’s conduct, including the act of coercing the former into a declaration of repentance. Those with a full understanding of what had occurred here seemed to recoil in horror at the might of the Chechen leader and his efficient brutality. And then the discussions began: perhaps Kadyrov was Putin’s de facto superior; perhaps the murder of Boris Nemtsov was a signal not only and not so much to the oppositionists as to the Kremlin itself – we decide for ourselves what to do in this country, and you can’t stop us or control us. We (Kadyrov’s Chechens) are the real power here (in Russia).

The Kremlin mandate

Kadyrov is indeed doing certain things – tough, radical things – without seeking Putin’s prior consent. And we cannot deny the fact that Chechnya is a de facto independent state, that it is part of the Russian Federation only on paper. However, Kadyrov’s very legitimacy as Chechen leader is secured to a significant extent by a Kremlin mandate (“the label of the white tsar”). A revocation of that mandate would seriously undermine Kadyrov’s position in Chechnya and in the Caucasus as a whole – particularly given the vast number (which runs into the thousands) of individuals and families who consider him their sworn enemy, and, in due course, an inevitable (rather than merely potential) target of blood vengeance in response to the deaths of their fathers, brothers and sons. So, while Putin categorically does not want to dispense with Kadyrov, whom he considers an important foundation for his own power and for the stability of the ruling system, Kadyrov, in his turn, simply cannot exist without Putin. The superior half of this formally informal tandem is ultimately Putin rather than Kadyrov, although Kadyrov’s role is undoubtedly far from being a minor one.

Kadyrov, in his turn, simply cannot exist without Putin

Oppositionists have organised social media flashmobs called “Kadyrov is the Shame of Russia.” And certain human rights activists and cultural figures (Messrs Ulitskaya and Mirzoev) have issued a public demand (albeit implicitly addressed to Vladimir Putin, since it’s only Putin who can decide such matters) for Kadyrov to be dismissed “immediately” from his position as leader of Chechnya – and, in doing so, have, needless to say, strengthened, albeit only marginally, the latter’s position. And so on and so forth.

Ramzan Kadyrov, then, remains a supreme irritant for significant swathes of Russia’s elites and people at large. He is a negatively consolidating figure, and requires counteraction by a positively consolidating figure. This, by definition, cannot be any (pro-)Kremlin politician, and especially not Putin, not with the country now in the state that it’s in.