Khodorkovsky sums up the Kremlin’s current project: to scare Europe and keep Ukraine under control.

A tycoon and philanthropist, liberal and ambitious, former owner of the Yukos oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Moscow, 1963) spent ten years in Russian prisons after his arrest in 2003, an emblematic case of the standoff between the Kremlin and the wayward oligarchs. From exile, the dissident draws a stark map of the war and Putin’s power in this conversation: Trump failed as a “good cop” against a “mobster” who interprets kindness as weakness; the succession in the Kremlin will bring a weaker leader, and at that point Europe should “work” with Russia. Invited to the Warsaw Security Forum—one of Europe’s leading security conferences—Khodorkovsky remains a mild-mannered, data-obsessed man who maintains the monastic patience of a prisoner when speaking. He mixes his cold realism with some risky predictions: he believes the end of the war could come this year if there isn’t “a better deal” for Putin. He is confident that the Russian army is not exhausted, but he calculates that any ambition beyond the Donbas would require a war economy and renewed mobilisation, a dangerous scenario for Putin. Khodorkovsky summarises the Kremlin’s current project: to frighten Europe and keep Ukraine under control; and warns that another Iron Curtain would only make Russia a vassal of China, so he proposes starting now to win over the children of the Russian elite.

Donald Trump came to power in January promising a swift end to the war in Ukraine, but he’s found himself confronted by the Ukrainians’ desire to continue resisting and Vladimir Putin’s continued pursuit of his bloodshed and ambitions. What is the US leader doing wrong?

I think Trump started well. First, he tried to eliminate the personal problems Putin feels, that as he ages, he is becoming more emotional than pragmatic. But then Trump made a mistake: he thought he could be the good cop in negotiating with Putin, and he failed, because Putin, being the mobster that he is, concluded that if someone is being nice to him, it means they are weak, and that maybe he can get an even better deal. Trump has realised that now, and he is trying to reverse the situation. But it is very difficult to undo this mistake. There is a fundamental clash that lies in the fact that for Putin to prove to his cronies and his people that he has won, he needs to control the Donbas. However, this is something Zelensky cannot allow politically. He cannot give him the Donbas. And if you look at what the Americans say, this issue will have to be resolved on the battlefield.

Do you think the war in general will be resolved on the battlefield or at the negotiating table?

Without a doubt, this war will have to end with negotiation. And, personally, I think Putin has some intention of ending the war this year. Now, whether this happens depends largely on Donald Trump and whether he can explain to Putin that he’s not going to get a better deal than the one he’s already been offered, that no one else will give him a better deal than the one on the table right now. It’s a possibility, which doesn’t mean it’s 100% going to happen. But I think it’s on the table.

Is Russia so aware of its own weakness that it might be open to negotiations one day?

Strategically, Russia’s position isn’t very good, but for the next three to five years, it can hold its own and continue doing what it’s doing now with relative ease. I think Putin has caused enormous strategic damage to Russia, and we’ll see the effects of this damage for the next 20 to 30 years. But if you look at the cards each side holds today, Europe is even weaker now.

In the Oval Office brawl in February, Trump told Volodymyr Zelensky he didn’t have any good cards. Who has worse cards now?

It baffles me when I hear Western experts say that the Russian military is weak. I believe there are currently only two armies present on the European continent: the Russian and Ukrainian armies. There is no other army, and there is no American army either: if you were to ask Americans how many soldiers they are willing to lose on European soil and in a European war, you would get a number around 1,000. Definitely less than 10,000. This is something Putin knows very well. And obviously, 10,000 soldiers is the number the Americans would lose during the first week of any conflict. We are talking about a serious conflict involving another army that is experienced in waging war. And since the Americans are unwilling and unable to lose 10,000 soldiers, that implies there is no American military presence on the continent.

Looking ahead, how can we prevent Russia from replacing one authoritarian leader with another when Putin one day leaves power?

Russian historical experience has shown that after a totalitarian leader, a weaker leader always comes. Most likely, it will be someone from the inner circle, but they will be selected from among the rest for their weakness. And at that point, it’s up to Europe; it’s basically a political decision.

How can Europe help?

The first path Europe may decide to follow, and which would be good for Putin and some of his friends in Europe, is basically to build another Iron Curtain. Russia will then become a vassal state of China. In Europe, we will basically share a border with China. Option number two is to reintegrate Russia into Europe, but that means we have to start working with Russian youth now, and we also have to focus on the children of the Russian elite. That sounds very unpleasant, but it’s a very pragmatic approach. It’s a political choice. Obviously, I would like to see Russia reintegrated [into Europe], but this is not up to me.

What do you think was Putin’s plan for 2022, and how have these plans changed?

In 2022, Putin envisioned Ukraine in the position Belarus is and has been in, and thought this would be easy to achieve. His current goal is, first, to scare Europe; and, second, to have Ukraine more or less under control, as Finland was historically under Russian control.

Speaking of Russian politics, what domestic factors could weaken Putin’s grip on power in the future?

There are two problems Putin faces. The first problem is that if you look at the conflict from today’s perspective, his army, what he has at his disposal now, is sufficient, but if the war were to grow in scale, if he decided to take Odessa or Kharkiv or something like that, the current army isn’t sufficient for that. He doesn’t have enough people. He would have to make a complete shift in the economy, toward a war economy, and he would need another round of [military] mobilisation. Politically, that is very dangerous and difficult for him. So, the first problem is that, yes, he has the resources to maintain the war as it is now, but he can’t expand his war efforts because that would be politically dangerous and difficult. The second problem is Russia’s dependence on China, a dependence that is growing.

Trump was trying to force a rift between Russia and China. Do you think that’s realistic?

In the case of China, Trump decided to play the bad cop. Europe, in its talks with China, basically decided to act like a beggar, someone who is powerless and can’t do anything. Because Trump’s approach to China was to bang the table and say, “I’ll make you do this.” While Europe is begging, “Could I please do something?” Actually, talking to China is perfectly possible. I’m not sure it will happen, although it’s realistic. But there has to be a transaction: you do this for me, I’ll do this for you. China is willing to negotiate in that format. I’m not sure a deal can be reached, but at the moment, no one is trying to talk that way.

The interview was conducted by Xavier Colás, and it was originally published in the  EL MUNDO