First a dictatorial peace in Ukraine, then Vladimir Putin attacks Nato? Regime expert Mikhail Khodorkovsky believes that Europe is strong – and that Trump has a trump card.

Mr Khodorkovsky, you were invited to Donald Trump’s inauguration. Do you still recognise the Americans?

Twenty years ago, we could say about the Americans, “these are the Americans”, because there was a bipartisan consensus on many issues, especially when it came to Russia. Today, “the Americans” no longer exist, because the division within the country is huge.

Is the Soviet leaders’ dream finally coming true: the Americans are leaving Europe and the Europeans alone with the Russians?

If you take them at their word, the USA will retain its nuclear umbrella over Europe, but will withdraw its conventional armed forces. How quickly? I have no idea. And is this a principled decision? Or is there a condition under which this decision can be negotiated? I haven’t yet understood that either. In any case, this is a fundamental change. But there is one important difference: compared to Soviet times, Europe is much stronger internally today.

Stronger than back then? Aren’t we much more divided?

Europe has a larger population and a stronger economy. Only one half of the Soviet Union remains, namely Russia, and most of the satellite states of the former Eastern Bloc are now members of the EU and Nato. Today, Europe can secure itself, that is absolutely solvable. But what conclusion does Europe draw from this? Just raising taxes for better defence won’t work. Then companies will move to other regions of the world. Cut social spending? Also difficult. But there is another possibility: under certain conditions, China could become Europe’s new guarantor – that could even bring economic benefits for Europe. But that comes at a price, of course. In any case, the big question for me is whether the Trump administration has calculated all of this correctly.

China as Europe’s guarantor – how is that supposed to work?

I have already heard from numerous European politicians that we need to strengthen relations with China. China has considerable influence on the Kremlin, as it is one of the largest, if not the largest trading partner and most influential player in the post-Soviet region. The economies of China and Europe complement each other in many ways and Beijing is not keen to see its biggest customer get into trouble. However, the price of political support will be both economic and political – partly in the area of tariffs, partly in the area of weakening human rights rhetoric and rhetoric regarding Taiwan.

If we can choose between a long trench war and détente, then I choose détente

You are one of the oldest and best-known opponents of the Putin regime. Isn’t this rapprochement between Trump and Putin very bitter for you? Because that means bad prospects for democracy in Russia, doesn’t it?

For the liberal section of Russians who oppose the regime, these negotiations are unpleasant. But if we look at it pragmatically, it looks different. The Putin regime could have been weakened in the event of a military defeat. That could have happened in 2022, but the opportunity was missed. What has happened since then may not strengthen the regime, but it doesn’t destabilise it either. The longer the war lasts, the more authoritarian the society becomes and the more intense the internal conflicts become. If we imagine that the Putin regime collapses in such a situation, then democratic development as a result is unlikely. Because in the event of an armed internal conflict, it will be very brutal from both sides – and a democracy rarely emerges from this, but rather a new authoritarian regime. So although I have been an opponent of the Putin regime for decades, I am convinced that a détente is in the interests of Russia’s democratic development. Of course, it would have been best if the Putin regime had fallen immediately. But if we can choose between a long trench war and détente, then I choose détente.

Security experts say that freezing the war will probably lead to a major war because Putin can then use his army to attack the Baltic states, for example.
I am convinced that if Trump agrees a ceasefire with Putin, it is very unlikely that Putin will then spit in his soup by launching an operation against Nato. Putin understands Trump’s personality: he is someone who takes it very badly if you make him look like a fool. Europe would then fight back and Ukraine would use the situation to solve the problems that would remain if the conflict were to freeze. I don’t think Putin would risk setting three motivated forces against him at the same time. That would be a mistake. But, of course, that doesn’t mean that a dictator couldn’t make a mistake.

Many experts say that Putin needs the war to keep society stable.

But a possible destabilisation after a ceasefire is only likely to occur after a year or two: Then demobilisation begins, people run out of savings and understand that they have no prospects. This applies to those who were at the front, but also to those who work in the defence sector. So he has at least a year and a half.

But Putin doesn’t think in such time frames.

Yes, he does, and right now it actually makes sense for him to end the war. The problems will only start later. I reckon that by the end of the second year after a ceasefire there will be a lot of pressure. And then we should remember: the most important goal for Putin is the final destruction of Ukraine. If he attacks the Baltic countries, he will have Ukraine at his back at the same time. But not the other way round. It is therefore very important that Ukraine is ready to resist at this point. And Putin is a cool-headed calculator, and he will choose an easier option to keep the mobilisation of the society high. For example, an all-out battle against dissidents in Russia – they will then be described by the regime as the ones who could put an end to Russia. But Ukraine must be prepared: defence facilities, army, weapons, aircraft. The message to Putin must be: You can attack, but the first time you lost 200,000 soldiers, now you will lose 500,000.

So you are a supporter of the so-called porcupine theory? That Ukraine will be armed to the teeth after a ceasefire so that Putin no longer dares to attack it?

Yes.

And is that primarily the task of the Europeans?

First and foremost, it is Ukraine’s task. But secondly, of course, it is Europe’s task. Because the USA has said quite clearly: we want to deal with other things. But the USA will not stop selling weapons. Europe will only provide a few soldiers, only a few countries are prepared to do so. But Europe can secure a no-fly zone, for example, with pilots who don’t have to come from Europe at all. You need air defence and aircraft for this, that can be done. The second task is the mass production and delivery of conventional weapons. However, the idea of producing these weapons in the ‘old Europe’ only partially solves the problem. A large proportion of the weapons must be produced in Eastern Europe and also in Ukraine – which is also cheaper.

Ukraine has offered the Americans a deal in which they would receive 50 per cent of Ukraine’s raw materials, particularly rare earths, in exchange for further military support. Is this a sensible deal?

I am very sceptical as to whether this agreement has any practical value. But it is very important as a narrative because Trump can sell this ‘deal’ to his voters. The extraction of raw materials takes time, sometimes several decades. To earn money, you first have to invest a lot. If we are not talking about oil and gas, the profits are not very high either. But what is still profitable in a situation with favourable loans will no longer be profitable in an unstable situation with high interest rates. So it could be that you have to invest $600 billion to get $500 billion worth of raw materials out of the ground and sell them.

You recently suggested that Putin would like to invite Trump to Moscow for the Russian ‘Victory Day’ on 9 May – what makes you think that?

Putin is obviously interested. I think that the Americans need to be prepared for the event that Putin raises this issue in the negotiations. Trump must understand that this is an issue of very, very great value to Putin. They can demand a lot in return. It’s an ace for the Americans, and that’s how they have to play it.

The interview was conducted by Moritz Gathmann, and it was originally published in German in STERN