Rebranding the 2016 State Duma election
Vladimir Churov’s removal from the Central Election Commission (CEC), of which he is the current chairman; and the almost certain appointment to this position of human rights ombudswoman Ella Pamfilova, has become a big media story in Russia.
In their assessments of Vladimir Putin’s personnel selection, the leading business publications have commented on the Kremlin’s attempts to rebrand the CEC and to give the elections a “human face,” thereby intimating that the forthcoming Duma campaign is to have an emphasis on fairness and transparency. Open Russia asked several political analysts to give their views on what’s really going on with the elections in the wake of the high-profile shake-up of the CEC. Could it be that things are genuinely headed in the purported direction of fairness and transparency?
Stanislav Belkovsky, for his part, is convinced that “nothing will change,” and, moreover, that “the progressive public, together with certain circles in the West, will find themselves restricted in their ability to criticise election results, having as they do a soft spot for Ella Pamfilova. In actual fact, then, this is yet another restrictive measure. The regime expects the backlash to the Duma election results to be considerably more tame than in 2011, meaning a new Bolotnaya Square-type protest is also much less likely to materialise.”
Ekaterina Shulman also believes that the Kremlin’s decision was motivated by a desire to take advantage of a figure who enjoys considerable support amongst precisely those circles most likely to rail against both the nature and the results of the upcoming parliamentary campaign: “It’s the media – both Russian and foreign – that I’ve in mind first and foremost. Secondarily, I’m also talking about NGOs – electoral observers, human rights bodies and civic groups that participate in elections in varying roles and enjoy a degree of clout on social media. Should these people get up in arms, the wider public will know about it, and they can subsequently organise mass rallies (protests, pickets, demonstrations). It’s the confidence of these people that the new chairwoman of the CEC is being drafted in to enlist.”
“In reality, the composition of the Duma is of absolutely no consequence”
According to Dmitry Oreshkin, the Kremlin knows only too well that that the end result of its relentless, decade-long discrediting of all democratic institutions could prove to be a military dictatorship, and therefore wants to “loosen the screws a little” by appointing Pamfilova. In doing so, moreover, it isn’t creating any genuine risk for itself. “In reality, the composition of the Duma is of absolutely no consequence – it will still be controlled by the Kremlin,” says Oreshkin. “And the percentage of the vote won by United Russia – 50%, like at the previous election, or 30% – is no less inconsequential. Even if the communists’ support grows by 15-20%, they’re still receiving the same financial assistance from the Kremlin, they’re still hanging on its lips, and they’ll still behave in a way that suits the Kremlin.”
Comparing Churov’s substitution for Pamfilova, with Putin’s replacement by Medvedev in 2008 (no fundamental change but a greater degree of permissiveness), Dmitry Oreshkin urges people to make use of the opportunity to “effect genuine liberalisation” that the new appointment affords: “I believe that the main challenge facing Ella Pamfilova – and one that is absolutely within the Commission’s purview – is to assist independent observers and to ensure that their legal rights are respected … If she fails in this, she won’t be able to achieve anything at all.”
But Dmitry Rogov is convinced that Ella Pamfilova’s efforts will certainly not generate any degree of liberalisation: “The CEC chairman must ensure that electoral legislation is respected and complied with. But electoral legislation in Russia is in itself anti-democratic and anti-constitutional, which effectively means that the CEC chairman must see to it that the rules limiting citizens’ electoral rights are duly respected.”
The issue of electoral rigging is particularly pressing. But experts aren’t expecting any particular breakthroughs here either. “The whole business of falsification will shift to the regions – to the level of district and territorial election commissions,” says Stanislav Belkovsky. “The CEC won’t be doing any rigging of its own – it will merely be certifying whatever results are obtained.”
“The Central Electoral Commission will merely be certifying whatever results are obtained.”
Dmitry Oreshkin insists that the scope of what Pamfilova can do must be precisely understood; we should not expect her to achieve the impossible: “This is the hardest challenge Ella Pamfilova has ever faced in her life. It’s beyond any doubt that she’s an honest, scrupulous, intelligent and experienced individual with a good understanding of the system – but what can she do about Chechnya, for example? The official turnout there was 99.6% – technically unthinkable – with 99.8% of the electorate voting for Putin, just like in the USSR. You could send a verification commission there, but they wouldn’t even be allowed to enter Chechnya. Then you’ve got a milder version of the same scenario in Kemerovo Region, with [Aman] Tuleyev amassing over 90% of the vote in the gubernatorial elections. If the CEC tries making life difficult for local election commission members, Pamfilova will face very stiff resistance from within the system.”
The experts are virtually unanimous on the question of whether Pamfilova’s appointment will open a window of opportunity for non-systemic oppositionists and independent single-mandate candidates, pointing out that it’s by no means necessary to deal with undesirables through the CEC. “Inconvenient candidates will either be barred outright from participating in the elections,” says Stanislav Belkovsky, “or they’ll be denied any requisite resources, including media and financial, which will make it impossible for them to mount an effective electoral campaign. So all undesirables will be destroyed long before the process reaches the CEC.”
Dmitry Oreshkin is sure that Pamfilova’s presence won’t serve to upset the system: “The fact that there have been changes in the CEC doesn’t mean they’ve changed everything else as well. Yes, the CEC won’t be putting spokes in people’s wheels – but why would it, when that sort of thing can be done independently of it? The Kremlin might have previously exploited the CEC, but now it’s trying a different tack: ‘right, we’ll make it [the Commission] honest and upright, and we’ll interfere and create difficulties in other areas instead.’”
Ekaterina Shulman, meanwhile, believes that Pamfilova’s appointment may have been prompted by the desire to maintain a degree of outward propriety during the elections: “Outward propriety is a broad concept: it might mean that a wide variety of players are allowed to participate (which is less likely), or at least that electoral participants won’t be subjected to direct police repression.” Asked whether she regards this desire to maintain a semblance of propriety as posturing, she replies, “I’m actually a big aficionado of every kind of posturing and hypocrisy in political life, because, in spite of everything, this is still a hallmark of being civilised. If you’re posturing, you’ve at least donned some sort of guise. That’s a step up from naked cynicism. It’s better than breaking the law and flouting established norms without even making a show of not doing so.”
An incredible 146% of the Rostov electorate turned out to vote at the previous Duma elections
Vladimir Churov survived at the helm of the CEC for nine years. During this period, Muscovites protested against the shameless falsifications of 2011, and are still being prosecuted for it. An electoral observer in Balashikha who witnessed an incident of ballot stuffing was so brutally beaten that he lost his spleen. Under Churov, an incredible 146% of the Rostov electorate turned out to vote at the previous Duma elections (this number is now firmly part of Russian folklore, and Churov will never cease to be reminded of it.)
It’s currently difficult to predict how much time Ella Pamfilova will be given at the CEC, or how much latitude. But one thing remains certain: in appointing Churov’s successor, Vladimir Putin has most certainly not sought to weaken the regime or his personal power – which would be the inevitable upshot of genuinely fair and transparent parliamentary elections.