Written evidence submitted by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Open Russia movement to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into the UK’s Relations with Russia

Mikhail Khodorkovsky

1: Introduction

I am submitting evidence to the committee because I believe my knowledge of the Russian government, and its inner workings, together with my persecution at the hands of that government, can provide both insight into the current regime, and pointers towards a better working relationship between Russia and the UK.

2: Summary

2.1 As a Russian citizen currently living in the UK, and conducting the activities of the Open Russia movement from the UK, I would like to highlight in my submission the following:

2.2: It has been the mistake of many democracies in the West to confuse the government of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, with the entire Russian population. The interests of the Putin regime and his circle are not the same as Russia’s national interest.

2.3: In reviewing your policy towards Russia, it is important to recognise that the rigid and narrow vertical power structure of the Putin regime is intrinsically unstable, and potentially liable to collapse at any moment. Moreover, there is no system of checks and balances to modify the discretionary decisions made by Putin, who has intensified the emotional component of decision-making. There are no guarantees of any stability in either agreements or inter-relations in this system; and the UK government must be prepared for that.

2.4: It is no longer enough to accept Russia as it is, and build policies with the current regime, but to look more pro-actively at a future Russia, and build normal, long-term contacts, corresponding to the type of relations that the British Government would like to see, and as such to engage in pro-active dialogue with civil society, and with young Russians (20-40 years old). They represent the future of post-Putin Russia, particularly given that, after the fall of the current regime, the probability of a radical change of the elite is very high.

2.5: For as long as the current regime remains in power, and for as long as it continues with its authoritarian tendencies, the UK Government needs to be prepared for continuing instability in the UK-Russia relationship, and its inevitable consequences, including, for example, the arrival of more political dissidents, which on the one hand both enhances the strong position of Great Britain in the matter of reaching out, and enhances its traditional (for the past five centuries) role as a secure island of refuge whenever changes of power occur in Russia. On the other hand, this position complicates relations with the current Russian government.

2.6: The UK must put its moral authority before a questionable economic short-term self-interest, for this would disrupt Britain’s traditional, special and significant ability to influence the necessary system of checks and balances of the Russian state.

3: Background

3.1 I am the former head of the Yukos oil company, which I built into one of the largest companies in post-perestroika Russia. I was an early supporter of the Russian opposition, and founded the Open Russia civil society movement in 2001, dedicated to promoting civil society values, and running educational projects for Russian youth, including building the Koralovo Lyceum for underprivileged children, which continues to operate to this day.

3.2 In the early 2000s I was critical of President Putin’s authoritarian tendencies, critical of the systemic corruption, and wanted to be allowed to run Yukos as a transparently independent and international enterprise. Soon after my much publicised, televised criticism of the president’s policies, in February 2003,[i] in October of that year I was arrested, charged and convicted of fraud and tax evasion. I fought the charges vigorously, charges which I, and many independent commentators, described as politically motivated. I was declared a “Prisoner of Conscience” by Amnesty International in 2011. [ii] Background on the case, and the circumstances of my 10-year imprisonment, are available online [iii] and in the submission made to parliament in 2012 by my son Pavel Khodorkovsky. [iv]

4: Post-release

4.1 I was pardoned by Vladimir Putin in December 2013, as part of a general amnesty of political prisoners, in advance of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.

4.2 Since my release, I have continued my long campaign for an alternative, liberal democratic Russia, speaking publicly and writing about the type of Russia that I would like to see. [v] This has also involved my actively meeting Western politicians, academics and “Russia watchers,” not only to put my views across, but also to discuss with them how we can achieve what I believe are our mutual goals, which I would describe as follows:

“The goal is to show people both in and outside of Russia that there is another model of development in our country, open to the world, not isolationist. What is needed now is a ‘horizontal’ alliance of the vast number of ‘small civic groups’ that form the underlying fabric of civil society. Only in this new, open and modern way is change for the better possible.

“We’re working to ensure that, when the regime collapses, Russia has political forces created with society’s understanding and recognition, that will keep the country from making the same mistakes all over again. And we need political forces that will act with a clear plan, putting the country on a healthy, democratic path of development, guided by the rule of law, the separation of powers, and fair elections.”

4.3 To that end, I re-launched the Open Russia movement in 2014.

Our mission is to foster a dialogue between Russia and the rest of the world; to promote the universal values of a democratic nation; and to present the alternative vision for Russia: a strong and just state with effective institutions, committed to observing human rights, free and fair elections, and the rule of law, where all of its citizens enjoy a better standard of living supported by a dynamic, diversified, and sustainable economy. 

4.4 Open Russia concentrates its energies on a number of targeted efforts: in education through our “Open Russia University” project; in election monitoring through our “Open Elections’ projects – of vital importance given the upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2016, and the presidential election in 2018; in human rights through our “Human Rights” project; and in media through our Russian- and English-language platforms. Taken together, these efforts represent my belief that peaceful change for the better in Russia is possible – an alternative vision that needs to be nurtured and developed in partnership with people who share our aims; the people who might well be running a post-Putin Russia.

5: Russia under Vladimir Putin

5.1 Many commentators, both Russians and non-Russians alike, have expended many column inches and many TV minutes, detailing the abuses of Vladimir Putin’s Russia; and they do not require repeating here. I would mention only the most unpleasant ones:

The muzzling of independent media; endemic corruption (as shown on a recent BBC Panorama programme);[vi] the manipulation of election results; the onslaught against civil society; the lack of an independent judiciary; the elimination of political adversaries, sometimes on foreign soil … To this catalogue of deliberately authoritarian policies, I would also add the failure to reform the economy so that it is less dependent on oil and gas, a policy whose destructive results[vii] we can see, with oil at some $30 a barrel.[viii]

5.2 Many people are aware also of the high approval ratings that the Russian president enjoys, and there has been an unfortunate tendency to equate those ratings with the belief that the entire Russian population is seemingly wholesale in favour of a Putinist Russia. This, I believe, is to mistake the complexities of Russian society, which cannot be divided so neatly into the “86%” that supposedly supports President Putin, and the remaining percentage of a “liberal opposition.”

5.3 More importantly, however, is the pernicious tendency I see in Western political circles, which says that if the Russian population is seemingly so happy with the status quo, then who are we in the West to look for change. To which I would say that the status quo has been good for no one (except the Putin regime). And the status quo is often no such thing; one might look at the Soviet Union in 1991, seemingly outwardly so impregnable, and remember how quickly the Berlin Wall came down. More recently, the annexation of Crimea came as a shock, the military adventure in Syria came as a shock; in fact, the entire West was shocked because you were misunderstanding the true nature of Putin’s Russia.

5.4 The UK needs to think now about what comes after Putin, not the moment when he falls, as fall he surely will. And the West must not repeat the mistakes of that earlier period, when it was unacquainted with, and unprepared for, the possibility of a post-Soviet alternative. And that unpreparedness, it might be argued, looking at Putin’s Russia, laid the grounds not for the liberal democracy the West believed would come – and did come for a short period ­– but instead produced exactly the opposite, a regime that increasingly resembles a Soviet one, albeit masquerading as a democracy.

5.5 What we need to think about, then, is how different Russia could look if the UK government were to cooperate with young Russian politicians and opposition activists, for a different (economically stronger, and less internationally aggressive) Russia.

6: UK’s current relations with Russia

6.1 I am writing this submission only a few days after the publication of the Litvinenko Inquiry. I see this report as confirmation of my belief – one that is shared by many other people, I am sure – that the UK’s relations with Russia are unsatisfactory, need to be addressed, and that a continuing policy of “business as usual” will not improve those relations.

6.2 With hindsight – although there was no shortage of commentators and critics who accurately described the situation as they saw it at the time – it can be argued that the UK has turned a blind eye to the abuses of Putin’s Russia, that it has allowed those abuses to multiply in Russia, allowed the fruits of corruption to be exported (besmirching the moral authority of the UK in the process), and failed to meaningfully curb the Russian regime’s international transgressions; and that this policy of appeasement has led directly to the unsatisfactory situation, which characterises today the UK’s relations with Russia.

6.3 However one views them, the Russia policies, which the British Government has chosen to follow in the 15 years that President Putin has been in power, quite clearly have not resulted in a situation that many people in the UK – government and general public – are happy with. What those policies have done, however, is to allow President Putin and his corrupt kleptocracy to remain in power, and to believe that they have a good chance of remaining in power for a good while longer. I would like to believe that the British Government would not like to see that situation continue; for this reason, it is my sincere belief that the UK must look beyond the situation in hand, and actively plan for a future Russia they would like to see.

6.4 The UK should not be afraid of going after the regime’s ill-gotten gains, for example, in the belief that this will somehow upset the Russian people. As I have said, there is no direct equation between the corrupt interests of the Russian regime, and Russia’s national interests. If anything, sending a strong signal to the Kremlin that the days of using the UK as a safe deposit box are over will increase the status of the UK in the eyes of the Russian public.

7: Future UK relations with Russia

7.1 I believe that in 2016 – and looking ahead to the presidential election in 2018 – the UK’s relations with Russia are at a crucial juncture, and that this situation both represents an increasing danger, and an opportunity.

7.2 We are looking at two different types of relations that the UK could have with Russia.

7.3 The UK can either opt for “Business as usual,” a policy that might result in a situation far worse than we have seen so far, one that passively accepts an economically weak Russia, with an increasingly authoritarian regime, leading to internal dissension (the recent truckers’ strike and the increase in public ­– though not publicised – demonstrations across the country, are an indication of what is to come), and a continuing, unstable international policy.

7.4 A passive policy that will have very visible repercussions in the UK: the arrival of more political dissidents (I hope that the British Government will not shy away from these people who represent the future of Russia, for they come to the UK believing in the values that underpin the very fabric of the United Kingdom); an ever more strident rhetoric; and tit-for-tat political, economic, and cultural conflicts. I hope and believe that the British Government is not intending to accept for much longer these very real and damaging consequences.

7.5 Or, the UK can develop a newly pro-active policy, one that thinks more about the type of Russia that we would all like to see, and do what we can to make it happen, which means engaging in dialogue with those sections of Russian society that represent an alternative vision for our country.

8: Conclusion

Russia’s economic weakness, the fragility of its power vertical, and the increasingly authoritarian and unpredictable polices of the Putin regime, represent a danger to the UK, a danger that is being made ever more dangerous by the UK following a policy of “business as usual.” It is in the interests of the UK to be bold in its future relations with Russia, not to think only of today, but to focus on tomorrow.

29 January 2016

Endnotes

[i] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Rajy4gO4KA

[ii]  Russia: Khodorkovsky & Lebedev are Prisoners of Conscience, Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19477

[iii] /resource-type/legal-background/

[iv] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/116/116we12.htm

[v] (please visit my personal website at /).

[vi] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35407795

[vii] http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/01/25/russian-gdp-contracted-3-7-in-2015/

[viii] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1a6226e2-c3d4-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html#axzz3yHhj7EdT