Dear friends, we have gathered here not because we were fortunate enough to leave. And not because we have somewhere to wait out the bad times. We have gathered because the Russian political diaspora today is part of Russian politics. Possibly the only part that can still speak freely, act openly, and build ties with the democratic world.

But the freedom to speak alone does not yet make us a political force. What makes us a political force are our goals, our sense of responsibility, our ability to reach agreements, and our willingness to work not only for ourselves, but for those who remained inside Russia. For Ukraine, for Europe, and for the future of Russia.

The first goal of the democratic diaspora is to honestly name what is happening.

The war against Ukraine is criminal. Russian troops must be withdrawn from all occupied territories. Internationally recognized borders must be restored. War criminals must be brought to justice, and the victims of aggression must receive compensation. Even if this takes years and years, that is our goal.

The second goal is to prevent Putin from monopolizing the image of Russia. The Putin regime wants the world to see only two Russias: an aggressive state and a silent population. Our duty is to show a third Russia: people who oppose the war, oppose dictatorship, and support a lawful, free, federal state. This is not only a question of our reputation; it is a question of Russia’s political future.

The third goal is to support those who remain inside the country. People there live under pressure, fear, criminal prosecutions, denunciations, censorship, and the threat of prison. We have no right to demand heroism from these people from a safe distance, but we are obligated to do what we can afford to do — support prisoners and their families, help independent media, defend lawyers, journalists, volunteers, and civic activists, and carry their voices to international institutions.

The fourth goal is to help Ukraine. Not symbolically, but practically. Support for Ukraine is not a foreign policy position of the diaspora, but the moral and political foundation of our existence. The anti-war movement has already made assistance to Ukrainian prisoners of war, demands for access for humanitarian organizations, “all-for-all” prisoner exchanges, and international monitoring of the treatment of prisoners among its priorities. This must not be episodic work, but permanent work.

The fifth goal is to build political representation. The Russian democratic diaspora cannot endlessly exist as a collection of separate leaders, separate foundations, separate YouTube channels, and separate conflicts. We need institutions.

The PACE platform for dialogue with Russian democratic forces is an important step. And it is important precisely because it creates a regular channel for consultation, political contribution, and coordination with European institutions. But any platform will only be strong when there is an organized community behind it.

The sixth goal is to develop a vision of a future Russia. It is not enough to say: “Putin must go.” That is correct, but it is not enough. After Putin, the country will not automatically become free. If we do not have answers to questions about federalism, property, the judiciary, lustration, the military, the regions, compensation for Ukraine, relations with Europe, the role of the security services, and so on — if none of this exists — then the vacuum will once again be filled by people from the old system. Our task is to prepare not only protest, but a project.

The seventh goal is to protect the diaspora itself. The Kremlin tries to reach people even abroad through criminal cases, through lists of extremists and terrorists — lists on which nearly half the people in this hall are included — and by creating problems with passports, bank accounts, residency status, and documents. Therefore, questions of visas, residence permits, documents, the rights of Russian-speaking residents of Europe, academic and cultural exchanges — all of this is not merely a matter of everyday convenience, but part of the political resilience of the democratic diaspora. Without a protected diaspora, there will be no sustainable political work.

The eighth goal is to speak with Russian society. The Kremlin wants to cut people inside Russia off from the world and convince them that Europe hates them because of their passports. We must explain: sanctions are directed against the regime; the war is being waged in the name of the state, but responsibility for the future lies with society. There must be a clear Russian-language politics not only for Brussels, Strasbourg, and Washington, but also for Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Vladivostok.

Finally, the ninth goal is to teach respect for differences within the democratic movement itself. We are not obligated to be one party, and we are not obligated to share one ideology. In a free Russia we will have different political programs, different voters, and different disputes. But today we have a shared minimum: to stop the war, dismantle the Putin regime — a regime that is the source of aggression and repression — free political prisoners, recognize human rights and freedoms, and reject discrimination and destructive public conflicts within the anti-war movement.

I understand that many people are tired. Tired of emigration, of poverty, of disputes, of mutual accusations, of the feeling that history is moving without us. But politics begins where exhaustion does not turn into capitulation. The Russian democratic diaspora possesses resources that people inside Russia do not: freedom of speech, the ability to gather, access to international institutions, security, knowledge, and professional networks. That is a great deal. Which means we also have an obligation to use those resources.

Our aim is not to become a government in exile, especially not on paper. Our aim is to become a functioning political infrastructure for assistance, representation, pressure on the regime, connection with society, and preparation for a democratic transition.

We do not know when the window of opportunity will open. But we know one thing for certain: if it opens and we do not have institutions, a program, personnel, and trust, then that window will close again. And it will close again for decades.

Therefore, the main question now is not who speaks the loudest on behalf of Russia. The main question is who is capable of building the force that Russia will need after Putin.

Thank you.